This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.
Introduction
It is well known since Salant et al. (1983) that a merger of a subset of the players acting to maximize the joint profits of the subset in a static quantity-setting oligopoly is not necessarily profitable. In fact they show that in the case of linear demand and constant marginal cost no less than 80% of the players must be part of the merger if it is to be profitable. In particular, a merger of two players is never profitable unless it results in a monopoly. Subsequent generalizations have confirmed that the merger must always involve a significant share of the market in order to be profitable for its members. The reason is that, in a situation of strategic substitutes, the firms outside the merger react to the joint reduction of output by the members of the merger by increasing their own output. The resulting aggregate effect on industry output will be positive, and hence the effect on price negative, unless the proportion of insiders is large enough for their reduction of output to compensate the increase of output by the outsiders.
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the effect on the equilibrium strategies and on profit of a similar merger in the context of a dynamic common property resource oligopoly. In the pre-merger equilibrium a fixed number of firms are assumed to exploit a renewable resource stock under common property and sell their product on an oligopolistic output market. In such a dynamic context each firm benefits from two sources of rent: the rent due to its oligopolistic market power on the output market, as in the purely static framework of Salant et al. (1983) , and the rent due to its access to the common resource stock. That stock is an asset which, if left unexploited, reproduces itself naturally at a rate which depends on the size of the stock. The marginal value attached to this asset by the firm varies inversely with the level of the stock and is taken into account when deciding on its rate of exploitation. In such a context, the profitability of a merger will depend on the level of the common stock at the time the merger is formed. It turns out that in the presence of the resource dynamics there always exists an initial interval of the stock inside of which any merger is profitable, even a merger of two firms.
The analysis is carried out in continuous time, using a non-cooperative differential game framework (see Dockner et al., 2000) . We focus on closed-loop strategies, whereby the strategy of a firm is a production rule that depends on the current stock of the asset (i.e. Markovian strategies). 2 The equilibrium of the game is very closely related to that proposed in ) we do not model nor address the issue of the decision to enter a merger, but simply assume the merger to be exogenously determined. Contrary to the static framework, in a dynamic setting one could raise the issues of the timing of the merger, as well as of the possibility of the merger being disbanded after some time and maybe even reformed later. We will neglect those issues here and assume that the merger is formed at the outset and is irreversible, so as to better concentrate on illustrating the contrasts with the static game and the role played by the renewability of the resource. Before concluding, we nonetheless show, via a simple example, that a profitable merger formed at the outset may indeed remain profitable forever. The rationale behind the result that any merger is profitable within some interval of the stock rests on the fact that, in this dynamic game, an action by one of the players that changes the level of the stock has an effect on the decision of all its rivals. Indeed, since each firm conditions its production decision on the size of the stock, when a firm (or a group of firms) changes its production the other firms' production decisions will now change for two reasons: the resulting change in the market price, as in the static context, and the resulting change in the stock of the resource, which is absent in the static equilibrium. As we will show, because of the presence of this stock effect on the rivals' production there is always an interval of stock such that overall equilibrium production falls following a merger of a subset of the firms. This explains why there is always some interval of the stock within which any merger is profitable, even one that is unprofitable in the static-Cournot equilibrium.
We will use the term "merger" throughout, but our analysis will apply just as well to some situations of collusive behavior other than actual mergers, where a subset of the players acts to maximize their joint profits. Production cooperatives are cases in point. As pointed out by Deacon (2012, pp. 263-264), "Fisheries cooperatives often perform the same management functions that a firm's manager performs: they control aspects of members' actions in order to achieve an outcome that is superior for the group." They do this by designating a manager to "partially control each harvester's fishing effort and structuring payoffs to provide an incentive to maximize the group's profit." In fact, as Deacon (p. 266), also notes, citing Adler (2004), "all horizontal agreements among commercial fishermen to restrain catches have been regarded as per se illegal" under US antitrust policy, as are in general horizontal mergers in conventional industries. Strict application of such a policy to fisheries of course neglects the dynamics of the common resource stock which our analysis will explicitly take into account. 4 Deacon documents a number of actual fisheries cooperatives in both developed and developing
